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Abstract
Responses to Hurricane Sandy consistently cluster into two types according to how the issues have been
defined and understood. On one hand, the crisis was seen as an extreme weather event that created
physical and economic damage, and temporarily moved New York City away from its status quo. On the
other hand, Hurricane Sandy exacerbated crises which existed before the storm, including poverty, lack of
affordable housing, precarious or low employment, and unequal access to resources generally. A Tale of
Two Sandys describes these two understandings of disaster and discuss their implications for response,
recovery, and justice in New York City.
The white paper is based on 74 interviews with policymakers, environmental groups, volunteer first
responders, and residents affected by the storm; ethnographic observation; analysis of public reports
from government, community-based organizations, and other groups; qualitative analysis of canvassing
forms and data; and a review of the academic literature on disaster response. As a framing document, A
Tale of Two Sandys selects certain case studies for their exemplary nature, including how different
groups identified vulnerable populations, timelines for aid and recovery, a case study of housing and
rebuilding, and finally, urban climate change politics. The primary purpose of A Take of Two Sandys is to
propose a sophisticated, accurate, and useful way of understanding the inequalities entwined with
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I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

f we think of Hurricane Sandy as the extreme weather that hit the New York City region on October 29,
2012, then the storm was one of the worst in the country’s history, killing dozens of people, affecting
hundreds of thousands, and inflicting as much as $75 billion in economic losses. But if we think of
Hurricane Sandy as the multitude of crises that followed the event, then it’s clear that each locale—and
perhaps each person—had its own unique confluence of crises, and its own “Sandy.” Homeowners on Staten
Island trying to deal with insurance claims; residents of public housing in Coney Island trying to navigate
highrise apartment buildings with no electricity; city officials trying to balance the budget this new fiscal
year: each faced their own disaster.
Yet, despite this wide range of needs, obstacles, and crises, Superstorm Research Lab (SRL) has found that
responses to Hurricane Sandy consistently cluster into two types according to how the issues have been
defined and understood. We tell A Tale of Two Sandys to characterize these two genres: on one hand, the
crisis was seen as a weather event that created physical and economic damage, and temporarily moved New
York City away from its status quo; on the other hand, Hurricane Sandy exacerbated crises which existed
before the storm and continued afterwards in heightened form, including poverty, lack of affordable housing,
precarious or low employment, and unequal access to resources generally. Even though there was crossover
and blurring between these two Sandys, the stakeholders that tended towards the first understanding of
Sandy included New York City’s government, elite institutions, and large NGOs. Community-based groups,
affected residents, many volunteer first responders, owner-operated businesses, and some NGOs tended
towards the second. In this white paper we describe these two Sandys and discuss their implications for
response, recovery, and justice.
This report is based on 74 interviews with policymakers, environmental groups, volunteer first responders,
and residents affected by the storm; ethnographic observation; analysis of public reports from government,
community-based organizations, and other groups; qualitative analysis of canvassing forms and data; and a
review of the academic literature on disaster response. As a framing document, A Tale of Two Sandys does
not cover all aspects of the crisis, but selects certain case studies for their exemplary nature. Its primary
purpose is to propose a sophisticated, accurate, and useful way of understanding the inequalities entwined
with Sandy’s aftermath and to enable ways to address them.

The Two Sandys division reaches deep into the
politics, economy, and everyday life of post-Sandy
New York, from housing, to aid, to climate change.
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Summary of findings
•

There have been two different ways of understanding and responding to the crises of Hurricane
Sandy. One tends to see Sandy-related crises as problems following directly from storm conditions
and to approach response efforts as means to restore the pre-storm status quo. The second sees Sandy
as exacerbating a chronic crisis characterized by poverty, low and precarious employment, and a lack
of access to resources such as transportation, healthcare, and education. We call this the Two Sandy
phenomenon.

•

While some groups portrayed elements of both Sandys, proponents for each group are mainly divided
among elite, powerful actors, and residents, community-based groups, and owner-operated
businesses on the ground.

•

Top-down, elite aid is characterized by finite programs with deadlines, while grassroots and
community aid often takes a longer view.

•

Equity and equality are often used interchangeably in NYC disaster recovery discourse about
resilience, yet are opposing concepts that result in mutually exclusive forms of aid and response.

•

The use of non-emergency population categories—everyday stakeholder categories such as
homeowners or students—rather than indicators of vulnerability, reproduces inequity and
vulnerability in disaster relief.

•

Some forms of disaster response, such as rebuilding loans that increase debt burdens, produce their
own second-order disasters and can move formerly resilient populations into more vulnerable
positions.

•

Since Sandy, government discourse and action towards climate change has shifted from prevention to
adaptation.

•

Top-down mandates for recovery create a mode of participation where the people most affected
can only react to those in power, rather than work in partnership to set recovery agendas that meet
community needs.

These findings are not unique to New York City’s response to Hurricane Sandy (Solnit 2010; Knowles 2012).
The disjunction between elite and community concepts and needs, as well as many other findings outlined
above, have occurred in other disasters in other places at other times. As such, this white paper works to
identify these trends and find meaningful points of intervention to amend them.
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INTRODUCTION
I really felt like there’s been two New Yorks since the storm, like the one that’s been completely turned upside
down since the storm and the one that’s going about business as usual. And I think it’s been hard for me to
spend time in the business as usual one without just kind of wanting to shake people and be like, ‘Do you
understand that people half an hour away from here are living in mold and you can do something about it if
you just like put on some gloves and get out there?’
- New York City resident and volunteer first responder

I think there were two pretty separate disasters happening in Red Hook at the same time—the one being
thousands of low-income people living without heat, or hot water, or power, and then there was also a bunch
of businesses that were really badly damaged. And some of them were small business owners, a lot of small
business owners who had very few resources, and then some bigger businesses, and so I think that whereas—
life is pretty much back to normal in the Red Hook houses. Some of those businesses have reopened, but I think
there’s a bigger difference in their lives from before the storm to now, than there is in the lives of people who
were living in the houses.
- Red Hook resident and director of a community-based organization

D

isasters always produce multiple crises.
The way individuals and groups experience
a disaster—and the impact the disaster
has on their lives—varies according to geographic
location and demographic characteristics such
as socioeconomic status, personal history, and
differential access to resources before, during,
and after the event. Hurricane Sandy, which tore
through the New York region in late October,
2012, exemplifies this reality. The storm affected
hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers in various
ways, from temporary power outages to long-term
loss of housing. Fifty-three New Yorkers died.
Now, a year later, the majority of those affected
have seen their lives return to normal. Yet, there is
presently broad consensus that hundreds of New
Yorkers still haven’t been rehoused, thousands are
dealing with economic insecurity resulting from
the storm, and even more suffer from enduring
physical and mental health problems. What’s
more, for many affected areas whose residents and
businesses were already struggling economically
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prior to the storm, a return to the status quo hardly
represents a victory. As illustrated by two excerpts
from our interviews above, the fact that Sandy was
experienced in very different ways by different
groups was not lost on New Yorkers.
The reality of one disaster with multiple crises is
at odds with the ideal underlying disaster relief,
where the goal is to bring everyone out of their
distinct crises into a shared recovery. Unfortunately,
the ideal of a shared, universal recovery is a myth.
Exploring Sandy’s troubled aftermath, Superstorm
Research Lab (SRL) discovered that even though
there were many different conceptualizations of
and responses to the disaster, they tended to cluster
into two genres. Over and over, elite and dominant
groups such as New York City’s government, elite
institutions, and large NGOs framed the disaster
as a discrete weather event that created structural
and economic damage, and temporarily moved
New York City away from its status quo, while
affected residents, volunteer first responders,

community-based organizations, and owneroperated businesses talked about ongoing social
and economic conditions, not limited to single
moments of destruction, that began before the
storm and continued afterwards. These included
pressing problems of poverty, lack of affordable
housing, precarious or low employment, and
unequal access to resources in general. We call this
the Two Sandys phenomenon, and it characterizes
the divergent definitions of crises and the plans
meant to address them across the whole of New
York City and surrounding area.
To be clear, the Two Sandys phenomenon is a
cultural frame for understanding the effects of
Hurricane Sandy rather than a way to map concepts onto individual groups. Not all members of
elite institutions focus on restoring New York City’s
status quo, and not every affected resident spoke
about wealth inequity. In fact, some individuals and
organizations contain a mix of the Two Sandys. For
example, one high-ranking city official wanted to
ensure that undocumented workers in the city received special aid given their lack of access to many
official response mechanisms, but FEMA declined
this differential support (SRL interview). Yet, at the
same time, FEMA worked closely with Occupy Sandy, which co-organized many of the relief hubs, and
tended to offer targeted support to undocumented
workers. Thus, the Two Sandys phenomenon is an
analytical framework which helps us to identify
distinct patterns in the way disaster was defined,
and these definitions tended to cluster around how
elite, top-down organizations versus grassroots,
bottom-up groups conceptualized the disaster and
recovery, while noting that individuals within these
groups may subscribe to either (and sometimes
both) definitions as the groups intersected with
each other in the aftermath of the storm and continue to do so today.
The Two Sandys division reaches deep into the
politics, economy, and everyday life of post-Sandy
New York, from housing, to aid, to climate change,
though the schism has its origins well before the
storm (Wallace & Wallace 1998; Cutter 2006; Yohe
2010). This division threatens to stretch into the
future as many Sandy survivors continue to recover,

as inequalities of disaster vulnerability persist,
and as climate change exacerbates the threat that
extreme weather poses to New York City. Each
of these problems can be diminished through a
city-wide commitment to social, economic, and
environmental justice. Doing so will require, first,
taking stock of the problem.
This white paper describes the Two Sandys
problem, both in initial experiences of the storm as
well as subsequent recovery efforts, and uses this
framework to analyze the main debates in recovery
taking place in New York City. Our analysis has
been informed by extensive research on the storm’s
impact on New York City and surrounding area,
including:
•

•
•

•
•

Seventy four (74) interviews across four groups:
policymakers and government officials, NGOs
and CBOs and other institutions involved
in relief and recovery efforts, professional
and volunteer first responders, and affected
residents;
Ethnographic observation of affected residents,
volunteer respondents, activist groups, and
policy meetings;
Analysis of policy and research reports by
government agencies, NGOs, and CBOs (a full
list can be found at www.superstormresearchlab.
org);
Qualitative analysis of canvassing forms and
data used by the City of New York and by
grassroots first responders;
Review of the academic scholarship on disasters
(reflected in the bibliography at the end of this
report).

The report is organized as follows. First, we
provide a vocabulary and framework through
which to analyze the Two Sandy problem. Then,
we look at some of the ways that multiple Sandys
were produced in seemingly innocuous choices
concerning how to identify vulnerable populations,
as well as timelines for aid and recovery. We then
move to a case study of housing and rebuilding,
particularly on Staten Island. Finally, we end with a
city-wide analysis of how the Two Sandy problem is
manifesting in urban climate change politics.
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EQUITY AND
DISCONTENT
Interviewer: When social scientists talk about the impact of a storm like Sandy, often they talk about it in
terms of inequality between races, classes and genders.
Interviewee: Horse shit. Never. I’ve never seen it and I’ve worked storms all over the country, nobody that
I know of or I’ve ever been associated with thinks like that. That is people who want to start crap. I have
never been involved where you think of poor versus rich, black versus white. I’ve been telling people for
years storms do not differentiate between Republicans and Democrats. You respond the same way no
matter who they are. The problem is in the poorer neighborhoods it’s a little more difficult to get back on
your feet because they don’t have the resilience, the money in the bank, the borrowing ability to go out
and get the money you need to rebuild your house, buy new stuff for your apartment. It’s not there. And
that, I think, is the fundamental issue.
- New York State emergency manager

A

major tension in disaster response and recovery is that, even if everyone is treated equally during the
event (which may or may not happen), the burdens of disaster are not borne evenly. In Hurricane
Sandy, this unevenness reflected the city’s spatialized economic inequality. The New York City area
is one of the most economically unequal metropolitan areas in the United States, and this income inequality
has increased in recent years (New York City Comptroller 2012; Weinberg 2011). Moreover, urban planning
in the post-war era relocated many of the city’s poorest residents to the coastline, the part of New York City
hardest hit by Sandy (Mahler 2012).
Interviews with residents heavily affected by
the storm revealed ubiquitous concern with the
difference in post-storm services received by rich
versus poor. People talked about watching FEMA
trucks drive by to wealthier neighborhoods with
more single-family homes and fewer rentals, as
homeowners talked about renters having an easier
time of recovery (SRL interview). City officials
anticipated scrutiny of their treatment of people
of different income and race categories. Fearful of
“another Katrina,” they sent canvassers to knock on
the doors of what one official called “our minority
friends” (SRL interview). As the opening quote
above explains, disparate burdens in the wake of
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crisis are not usually intentional neglect and every
effort is made to distribute aid equally, but uneven
recovery persists nonetheless, often along lines of
socioeconomic status. Thus, the root problem in
equitable disaster recovery is not the actions and
intentions of individual actors. Rather, the problem
is systemic, and extreme events highlight and
reproduce inequities that existed before the storm.
This section starts with a definition of inequity and
its relationship to terms used in disaster discourse
such as vulnerability and resiliency. It then details
the kinds of interventions that can address inequity
and those that do not.

Equity versus equality
[We] said, ‘Look, we’re looking to see if we have the capacity to feed everybody, faculty and also families.
We don’t know if we can, but it’s something we’re looking into.’ So, then this guy says, ‘I really think you
should plan to have the Public Safety vans bring food to the people in outlying areas.’ So I said to him,
‘Well, where do you live?’ He said, ‘I live in the Bronx.’ And I said, ‘But you had power in the Bronx.
Why…why would we have brought you food?’ And he said, ‘Well, that’s just fair. If the people down here
are getting food, why wouldn’t we?’
- High-ranking administrator at an NYC university

The concept of fairness quoted above was not
uncommon after Hurricane Sandy, although it
was rarely expressed in such extreme terms. Some
city officials said that Sandy was the storm that
equalized everybody overnight, but of course
some areas had power and food while others did
not. Moreover, those most affected by the storm
were affected differently depending on pre-storm
vulnerabilities and resilience.
The Red Cross defines vulnerability as the
diminished capacity of an individual or group
to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from
the impact of a natural or human-made hazard
(IFRC 2013). Vulnerability is usually associated
with poverty, “but it can also arise when people
are isolated, insecure and defenseless in the face of
risk, shock or stress” and so includes impoverished
social networks as well (IFRC 2013). Resilience
refers to the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb,
recover from, and more successfully adapt to
adverse events (Cutter et al 2013). It also involves,
“at a deeper level, consideration of the complexity
and interconnectedness of systems” such as social,
economic, and political systems (Thayer et al
2013, p 2; also see Buckland 1999). This means
interrogating the complex structural reasons why
high vulnerability and low resilience cluster in
certain geographical areas and within particular
populations. For example, in Far Rockaway, an area
that already had low access to healthy food before
the storm, stores were not open and there was no
access to cars or public transportation, the situation
was particularly dire. One resident explained, “We
didn’t have any power, any stores. Even if you had
money, it was useless because you couldn’t buy

anything. Nothing was open. So I really went two
or three days without eating until they brought the
Red Cross and stuff out here” (SRL interview).
Interventions, whether via policy or immediate aid,
must address these differences in vulnerability and
resilience for a just recovery. That is, for equitable
versus equal allocations of aid. Here, equality refers
to fair exchange, where each individual or group
receives the same quantity of goods. Equity is about
fair or just allocation, where greater needs receive
greater attention and resources with the goal of
bringing everyone to similar levels of vulnerability
and resilience. The even distribution of risk over
groups in a population is called “dispersive equity”
(Fishburn and Sarin 1991). For example, equal aid
would ensure everyone gets two loaves of bread—
the foundations of the quotes that opened this
section—while equitable aid would provide people
with as much bread as they need. Dispersive equity
would aim to ensure everyone has two loaves of
bread in their cupboards before disaster hits.
Equity in disaster is further complicated because
immediate relief and “build it back” plans can fail
to achieve dispersive equity by attempting to make
things the same as they were before the storm.
In best case scenarios, such plans reproduce the
Two Sandys phenomenon, as people with little
resilience are in the same vulnerable position as
before the storm. At worst, uneven aid can put
populations in even more vulnerable positions
for the next disaster (see, for example, section 5
on the case of increased debt post-Sandy). Thus,
equitable recovery must address systemic causes of
vulnerability and low resilience, rather than focus
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exclusively on technological fixes that put sandbars
and new flood zones in place, but fail to address the
social and political foundations of uneven risk. As
will be discussed in the next section, a commitment
to equitable aid alters both the content and the
timeframe of disaster relief and recovery work. As
a director of a community-based organization that
became a relief hub after Sandy explains:
“The obvious thing to say about the storm
in low income communities like Red Hook
is that it was this very graphic sort of spedup lens into the kind of grinding need that’s
always there, so people in Red Hook always
need jobs. There’s always income insecurity. There’s always crappy food supply, lousy
schools, no good public transportations daily, right? All those things got really magnified
during the storm, and there was a lot of attention on addressing them in the short-term.
In the long-term there’s still no high school in
the neighborhood. There’s still—people don’t
have jobs” (SRL interview).

The Two Sandy framework clarifies these issues.
If equality informed recovery logic of elite
institutions after the storm, the concept of equity
directs attention to the specific experiences—
and needs—of recovery at the individual and
community level (Cook 1983; Culyer 2001; Pratto
et al 1999). Interviewees and CBO public reports
consistently point out inequity rather than equality
as a key problem within disaster response resource
distribution. This frame reverses some top-down
decisions to recognize, and then dismiss, prestorm vulnerabilities as basis for recovery aid. For
example, some people without housing after the
storm who were placed in hotels had been either
homeless or marginally housed before the storm.
Rather that extending equitable aid to raise affected
New Yorkers to less vulnerable positions overall,
those with highest vulnerability due to chronic lack
of housing were excluded from assistance altogether
(Coalition for the Homeless 2013).

The concept of equity directs attention to the
specific experiences—and needs—of recovery at the
individual and community level.
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AN ANALYSIS OF AID

I

f inequity in disaster response and recovery is systemic, rather than the result of deliberate individual
or group action, then how does it come about? This section looks at a selection of seemingly benign but
high-impact ways that top-down responses to the storm by elite institutions produced or reproduced
uneven vulnerability and low resilience.

Stakeholders versus vulnerable populations
About FEMA, I can tell you they came a few times. As a result of the hurricane we had cracks in the
walls. FEMA didn’t pay too much attention to that, they said it’s personal, but it’s Projects here so they
[management of building] need to take care of it and FEMA isn’t responsible. And we were registered. In
general, let me tell you that when our houses were in management independently everything would be
fixed instantly.
- Coney Island resident

One of the major dilemmas facing disaster aid is
the mismatch between inherited everyday social
and spatial categories, such as “homeowner” and
“renter” or “Brooklyn” and “New Jersey,” and how
disasters consistently cross and defy those systems
of organization. Institutions whose daily activities
do not include emergency response—from federal
and state governments to educational centers
to community-based organizations—have an
overwhelming incentive to take the categories and
jurisdictions they use in their everyday activities

and apply them to disaster relief. Hurricane
Sandy was no exception. The problem is that this
approach unjustifiably privileged some groups over
others. In some cases, the decision was deliberate.
For example, the first iteration of New Jersey’s
state action plan directed far more aid resources
at homeowners than renters, when both were,
and continue to be, homeless (Fair Share Housing
Center 2013; Coalition for the Homeless 2013).
In other cases, pre-existing categorizations meant
that vulnerable populations were overlooked.

Photo “Occupy Sandy” by Victoria Walker licensed under CC BY-ND 2.0
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For example, when an NYC university organized
emergency aid for its resident population, it focused
on undergraduate students on campus, but not
those in campus faculty housing whose residents
included small children, the elderly, and people

with disabilities. Using categories or jurisdictional
boundaries created for non-crisis routines is
efficient, but can exacerbate, or even create,
disparity.

Definitions of crisis and effects on aid
This is three freaking months, if you haven’t found a place to be warm in three freaking months you don’t
need the city’s help; you’ve already figured it out. […] At some point the responsibility of government has
to stop somewhere and you as Joe Blow citizen need to figure out how to do your own thing.
- NYC government official

I mean recovery is a loaded word when you’re talking about places that have been screwed over before
the storm like Coney Island. There’s not going to be a point where you come up and say ‘all right, now the
recovery is finished and it’s good.’ You’ve got 60,000 people living in high-rise housing projects without
adequate services whether it is health care services or [building] sanitation services.
- Volunteer first responder

Different first response groups in NYC identified
the main crises caused by Hurricane Sandy
differently. Consistently, government officials
made clear demarcations between storm effects
and other, more systemic problems, focusing on
evacuation successes and failures, immediate
and short term sheltering logistics, fuel and
transportation problems, changes in access to
healthcare following the closure or evacuation of
hospitals, and barriers to rebuilding (City of New
York 2013b). In the city’s After Action Report, for
example, the identified areas of concern are all
issues which started a few days before the storm,
and can be addressed by technical fixes in the near
future. And while city and state governments have
devoted a substantial amount of planning efforts to
long-term reconstruction after Sandy, the bulk of

these efforts have focused on protecting rather than
changing the social status quo. The NYC Special
Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR), for
example, proposes new developments in Manhattan
to address the “shortage” of office space (City of
New York 2013a).
However, advocate, grassroots, and communitybased groups consistently saw Hurricane Sandy and
its effects as a punctuation mark in a much longer,
chronic crisis of wealth inequity and unequal access
to resources. Income insecurity, a lack of access
to education, unaffordable housing stock, and
widespread debt -- the long-term trauma of poverty
and insecurity -- are disasters in and of themselves
(Erikson 1995). For many communities, “back to
normal” does not mean recovery, but a return to

Different first response groups identified the main
crises caused by Hurricane Sandy differently.
Government officials made clear demarcations
between storm effects and other systemic problems,
while groups on the ground saw the storm as a
punctuation mark in a much longer crisis.
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Photo “Sailors assist with Hurricane Sandy clean-up.” by Official U.S. Navy Imagery licensed under CC BY 2.0

poverty and vulnerability. Thus, grassroots groups
such as Alliance for a Just Rebuilding, a coalition
of faith groups, labor unions, community groups,
and policy and environmental organizations, frame
recovery in terms of good jobs, affordable housing,
renewable energy, accessible health care, and
community consultation for recovery plans rather
than returning New York City’s status quo (Alliance
for a Just Rebuilding 2013).
The differences between the two genres of
recovery concerns not only the type of aid, but
also its timeframe. Government programs are
characterized by deadlines for aid applications,
implying that the crises began all at once on
October 29, 2012, and that certain needs will end
by the deadline. While some city and state recovery
plans address what they see as long term problems
in New York City, such as a lack of office stock,
these are not framed as Sandy-related problems,
but a sort of recovery “bonus,” and the underlying
premise of elite responses is that New Yorkers are
moving through the crisis at a similar rate. Yet,
even for something as material as housing repairs,
some people fled New York City after the storm and
throughout the winter, and returned to flooded,
mold-infested buildings six months later during
the summer. If deadlines are needed for program
efficiency, rolling deadlines or open enrollment
would be more appropriate for these realities. Some
grassroots and community-based organizations,

such as Occupy Sandy, see the recovery in terms
of years and even generations to address systemic
issues such as wealth inequity. This definition of
recovery also extends the geographical area of a
chronic disaster beyond hard hit areas into parts of
New York City that remained dry during the storm,
but that can be classified as vulnerable populations
in an ongoing crisis.
This is not to say that government and other elite
methods of organizing aid during Sandy were
wantonly neglectful. Indeed, the trends outlined
here are common across many disasters in various
countries (Solnit 2010; Knowles 2012). This tale of
two Sandys and the resulting dual genres of disaster
aid are premised on long term, systemic inequities
produced and reproduced by economic, social,
cultural, and historical forces. Many government
actors are aware of the systemic roots of the Two
Sandys problem, both within and outside of
disaster scenarios (Lu 2010). New York City can
be a more sustainable city, and even a leader in the
field, by rebuilding infrastructure, programs, and
funding in ways that achieve dispersive equity by
addressing uneven burdens of social, economic,
and environmental harm for all neighborhoods and
populations.

Page 11

HOUSING: REBUILD,
UNBUILD, OR BUILD
BETTER?
Thank God they finally stopped running those commercials because I wanted to shoot the TV. ‘Repair.
Repair, rebuild, get home.’ And so this is what people were doing. This is why they maxed out their saving
accounts, their credit cards, their 401K. Everything that they could possibly pull from to get themselves
back in their homes.
- Staten Island resident

The housing situation has been compounded. We have a housing problem period, in New York City, but
now it’s really compounded by homeless people. Now we have homeless people as a result of Sandy and
we have a continuing shrinking affordable housing market. That’s a disaster if I’ve ever known one. The
next Mayor is going to have to address housing. And with a particular view of preventing climate change
impact on that housing. So if they build exactly where they were before, that’s pretty much Einstein’s definition of insanity.
- Executive Director, environmental justice organization

H

ousing is a complex case of the Two Sandy problem because of the way the issue manifests in an
ongoing debate—particularly on Staten Island—over whether rebuilding is the best strategy to meet
people’s present and future needs. There has been some success in overcoming the Two Sandy divide,
but also lingering failure.

Rezoning and recovery
Some argue for redeveloping damaged structures
in a more storm-resilient way, while others would
prefer to limit rebuilding and development in
flood-prone areas. State officials—at the urging of a
number of residents—have been making the latter
case, and the City of New York the former. As the
state and the city negotiate over which areas should
be eligible for redevelopment and which should
return to open space, many residents remain in
limbo, caught between clashing government visions
of recovery.
The neighborhood of Oakwood Beach on Staten
Island is a rare example of community members
and government working together fruitfully. A
group of nearly two hundred homeowners met
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shortly after Sandy and collectively decided they
wanted to move rather than rebuild. Together,
they successfully lobbied for a government buyout
of the neighborhood. Governor Cuomo declared
their homes part of an “enhanced area” that the
state would convert to a public park or wetlands to
protect from future flooding and storm surge.
Soon after Governor Cuomo announced in January
that he intended to buy out damaged houses
(Kaplan 2013), hundreds of other homeowners
along the South and East Shores of Staten Island
formed groups to press for buyouts in their own
areas. Yet, such aid is far less certain for these new
groups in nearly every other devastated shorefront
community on Staten Island: the buyouts have

recently been extended to Ocean Breeze (State of
New York 2013), but New Dorp Beach, Midland
Beach, and Crescent Beach, among others, have not
yet been taken up on their petitions for buyouts. In
these cases, it has proven difficult for community
groups and government to transcend the Two
Sandy divide.
These areas may only be eligible for New York
City’s alternative to the state buyouts, a plan that
would enable, rather than prohibit, redevelopment.
“The city is vehement about wanting to redevelop
the waterfront,” a state official explained in an

SRL interview. To accommodate this drive for
development, the City’s Build it Back program
offers individual residents, as opposed to
neighborhoods, an “acquisition for redevelopment”
rather than a buyout. It remains unclear who will
be eligible for this assistance. At the time of writing,
only one home has been bought through the City
program. Some who initially wanted to relocate
have been unable to wait any longer for a place
to live under either program, and have rebuilt or
are returning to live in houses that are moldy or
structurally damaged.

A legacy of challenges
Staten Island’s confused, contradictory housing
recovery process is only one way that the
mishandling of post-disaster housing is creating
an entirely new crisis for many New York City
residents—including renters, NYCHA tenants,
and immigrants, in addition to homeowners. A
report by Strike Debt (2012) shortly after Sandy
found that most aid to individuals occurred in
the form of loans, and thus will “ultimately make
long-term financial burden the precondition for
‘recovery.’” Many homeowners SRL interviewed,
some of whom were already “under water” on
their mortgages, have incurred substantial debt
to rebuild their homes. Others have gone into
foreclosure, unable to afford mortgage payments in
addition to paying rent for temporary housing. This
temporary housing was required because the city
declined FEMA trailers to house displaced people,
and municipal programs housing displaced people
in hotels recently ended.
Residents who chose to rebuild in flood-vulnerable
areas face expensive elevation requirements and
sharply increased insurance rates, particularly as
national flood insurance subsidies are phased out
under the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform
Act of 2012. Costs remain uncertain, since the
FEMA flood maps that determine insurance rates
and rebuilding requirements are being revised, and
final maps are not expected for at least another year
at the time of this writing.

For renters, and those displaced from their homes,
there is an acute lack of affordable housing. A
survey of renters on Staten Island by Make the Road
New York finds that rents have increased and that
overcrowded apartments are more common since
Sandy (report is forthcoming 2014). More residents
are now living with mold that will produce long
term health effects. Thus, conflicting policies and
timelines, alongside a lack of communication,
continues to contribute to delays and confusion.
Housing recovery is now compounded by a
“second Sandy” in the form of a financial crisis
centered on debt-based aid, foreclosures, and steep
insurance and rebuilding costs, as well as the health
effects of living in substandard housing. For these
populations, the effects of Sandy are as acute now
as they were a year ago. Even if many homeowners
possessed higher resilience in the immediate
aftermath of Sandy, they are now in a significantly
more vulnerable position for the next extreme
weather event. All of our interviewees, regardless of
their position, agreed that there will be a next time.
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CLIMATE CHANGE:
MITIGATION TO
ADAPTATION
Climate change is now in the city’s DNA.
- City government disaster relief officer

A

fter Sandy, high profile figures in the public sphere suggested the storm would transform climate
politics (Hansen 2012; Barrett 2012; Borenstein 2012). Yet, our interviews found that for the most
part, people who were already concerned about climate change continued to be so, and those who
were not, continued not to be even if they were persuaded that climate change played a role in the storm.
Careful attention to the problem was largely restricted to government actors and other policy experts, with
some exceptions among community groups and individuals that do not possess the same resources to make
large scale changes to climate politics compared to municipal government and its allies. Global warming
remains a looming threat to the city.

A failure to address greenhouse gas
emissions
The Two Sandys phenomenon in climate politics
is fostered by city government setting the agenda
for the city’s climate politics while failing to engage
the broader population in the problem. After
Sandy, this meant that the city’s shift in emphasis to
adaptation (efforts to limit NYC’s vulnerability to
climate change impacts) sidelined the fundamental
need for the city to show leadership with regard
to mitigation (reducing the magnitude of climate
change itself ). The mayor and city council still
have a responsibility to reduce emissions of the
greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change,
but so far their actions have fallen far short of what
was promised even in the city’s own climate change
plans (City of New York 2007).
In May 2007, Mayor Michael Bloomberg released
an ambitious, multi-decade plan for the city
called “PlaNYC 2030”. The plan’s top priorities
were to help prevent or lessen the effects of global
climate change by cutting the city’s greenhouse
gas emissions (mitigation), and, to a lesser extent,
making changes in systems and infrastructure
Page 14
14
Page

in anticipation of global warming’s effects
(adaptation). No community group representative
sat on either of the two climate-oriented panels that
Bloomberg established, and environmental justice
groups were hardly consulted during the important
phases of drafting the plan (City of New York 2008;
Rosan 2011). In the years after PlaNYC’s release,
the sustainability initiatives that gained the most
attention—such as bike lanes, park improvements,
and tree-planting—were debated with little
reference to climate. Climate change as such began
to fade from the public discourse, even as policy
experts within government and in some institutes
and NGOs stayed focused on the problem.
After Hurricane Sandy, most interviewees from
policy-oriented sectors said that the storm had
changed the conversation, putting climate change
at the top of the public agenda. But we found little
evidence of this, especially with respect to taking
action to reduce New York’s contribution to the
global problem. The city’s own Special Initiative
for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) report

generally ignores the need to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions (City of New York 2013a), even
though SRL interviews with climate change experts
demonstrate that mitigation and adaptation
complement and enhance one another. Moreover,
the two principal community-rooted responses to
SIRR—one from the Alliance for a Just Rebuilding,
and the other from the Sandy Regional Assembly—
prioritized doing more for lower-income and nonwhite New Yorkers in the rebuilding process even
when they also devoted space to reducing emissions
(Alliance for a Just Rebuilding 2013; Sandy
Regional Assembly 2012). A union representative
reported in an interview that although change was
on the minds of their organization’s members, jobs
and healthcare would remain their top priorities.
Technically, mitigation remains on the agenda, but
it has drifted dangerously far from the spotlight.
Serious mitigation measures may pose a threat to
powerful interests. Social scientists have found
that when it comes to responsibility for emissions
generated indirectly by consumption, emissions
correlate closely to wealth (Chakravarty et al 2009).
Counting emissions associated with airports also
makes a big difference–especially in cities with
large tourism industries. Putting a city like New

York in global perspective, the shift away from
exploring ways of reducing the emissions for which
NYC is responsible and towards safeguarding
residents from flooding, looks like an abdication
of responsibility to the wider world. The city’s
emissions will continue to harm people in places
like the Philippines and Bangladesh, even if efforts
are made to protect the health and safety of local
residents.
Many groups, like New York’s Urban Green
Council, have advocated for combining adaptation
and mitigation (Urban Green Council 2013a).
Urban Green has also highlighted how New York
University’s co-generation plant not only evinced
resilience during the storm—the power stayed on
in a number of key buildings when the main grid
shut down—it also significantly cut the university’s
carbon emissions by recycling energy (Urban Green
Council 2013b). Broader social policy can also
address mitigation in surprising ways. Policies like
Mayor-elect Bill de Blasio’s proposed tax on New
Yorkers earning half a million dollars or more could
reduce what climate justice scholars call “luxury
emissions” (Agarwal and Narain 1991) by reducing
the consumption of the very wealthy.
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The Two Sandys phenomenon in climate politics is
fostered by city government setting the agenda for
the city’s climate politics while failing to engage the
broader population in the problem.

Solutions from the grassroots
Transcending the Two Sandy problem could also
mean combining the resources of government
and elite groups with the creativity and energy
of people and groups presently outside those
circles. New Yorkers affected by Sandy, community
groups, and some NGOs have understandably been
preoccupied with engaging government agendas for
rebuilding-- agendas with an almost exclusive focus
on adaptation. This puts them in a reactive position.
Nevertheless, some grassroots groups have seized the
opportunity to engage creatively in a broader set of
climate politics.
For example, Uprose, an environmental justice
organization in Sunset Park, hosted a climate
justice youth summit for young people of color
in July, seeking to funnel discontent with extreme
weather’s impact into a broader campaign on
climate. Elizabeth Yeampierre, Uprose’s executive
director, said that poor people of color were
disproportionately affected by the direct and indirect
impacts of Sandy and need to take leadership, not
just in building a community-wide movement, but
also in pushing the US climate movement in general
to be more diverse (SRL interview).

Another example is El Puente, an environmental
justice organization based in Williamsburg that
helped organize an Encuentro in Puerto Rico in
the Spring of 2013 to take advantage of Puerto
Rico’s diaspora to apply long-term political pressure
on politicians to take stronger action on curbing
emissions. The focus was on organizing in Chicago,
New York, and Miami, where the Puerto Rican
community has leverage with the Democratic Party.
A third example has been the widespread work
within Occupy Sandy to create a grassroots
movement to address climate change in terms of
wealth disparity and the fossil fuel industry, most
concretely with the Wildfire initiative (a long-term
community-based social justice organization)which
was founded in Far Rockaway).
These small groups confront challenges in engaging
with the large-scale politics of preventing the worst
impacts of climate change. But leadership from
below is as important as leadership from above.
Indeed, it will prove crucial to forcing governments,
corporations, and large civil society groups to take
urgent measures to help prevent climate change.

Photo “Breezy Point, NY - After Hurricane Sandy” by Christopher D. Sondi licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
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CONCLUSION

T

his white paper has illustrated some of the diverse ways that two competing logics of recovery—the
Two Sandys phenomenon—have shaped the Hurricane’s aftermath in New York City. The Two Sandys
problem is systemic. It does not follow from individual choices and intentions, but rather from largescale, deeply entrenched social structures. This means that while short-term responses to the disaster are vital
to alleviate immediate suffering, true solutions to the Two Sandys problem must be systemic solutions. This
requires shifting the discussion away from arguments that “the government messed up,” towards the reasons
elite aid across disasters and throughout the last several decades tends to respond in ways that often do not
line up with the needs of people on the ground.
Thus, this white paper moves away from the countless conceivable technical fixes for disaster towards
something that has received much less attention: the cultural tendencies to understand disaster in two
fundamentally different ways. If we make progress on this cultural macro-level, the technical specifics will
follow. Uneven vulnerability and a lack of distributive equity is the prime issue for disaster planning and
response to address. Addressing unequal access to education becomes an appropriate disaster plan. Building
and maintaining access to affordable housing becomes a disaster plan.
This paper has also sought to demonstrate that the less visible Sandy manifested in all manner of grassroots
leadership and organizing—a chaotic but energetic series of responses. This warrants more attention.
Grassroots and community organizing is not just an expression of frustration and suffering, but also a
source of hope for a more equitable recovery and more widespread resiliency. This will mean addressing the
structural roots of inequality that Superstorm Sandy helped lay bare, and which elements of the recovery
helped reproduce them. Our hope is that telling A Tale of Two Sandys can all help all New Yorkers better
understand their situation and clarify their options.
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